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The Crisis in Municipal Finances 
THREE STEPS 
TO SOUND MANAGEMENT 
If the family budget is being squeezed today, so are municipal 
budgets in communities of every size. The numbers, however, are 
much larger and the reasons more complex. Contributing to 
the cities' problems are factors such as rising labor costs, 
demographic change, and the energy shortage, not to mention 
our seemingly inexhaustible demands for more and better public 
services of every kind. 
The budget squeeze exists, even though cities are taking in 
more money than ever before. Figures gathered during the latest 
Census of Governments, which is performed every five years by 
the US Census Bureau, show that in 1971-72 all US municipalities 
collected general revenues of $35 bil l ion—up 81 percent since 
1967 and 270 percent since 1962. Despite recent tax increases of 
10-25 percent, however, the US Conference of Mayors reports 
that a survey of 50 cities shows municipal revenues in 1975 
running as much as $8 bil l ion short of expenditures. 
The result is that we can pick up any newspaper today and 
read that the application of federal bankruptcy law to the public 
sector is now being discussed as something of more than 
theoretical interest. New York City's fiscal crisis has, indeed, 
called attention to what may be in store for other communities if 
present trends continue. 
The fol lowing articles shed light on the critical subject of 
municipal finance. Ted David provides a survey of the basic 
revenue sources available to urban governments, with commen-
tary on various factors that may affect their suitability in specific 
localities. An understanding of one's options is essential when 
deciding the " m i x " of revenue sources that will furnish 
consistent, reliable financial support. Philip Dearborn addresses 
the creditworthiness of city governments, arguing that timely 
payments are the most important criterion. He reviews some 
indicators that can help to guide one evaluating cash manage-
ment in any city. In addit ion, Fred Rohn summarizes the type of 
information major rating agencies use to arrive at a quality rating 
for municipal general obligation bonds. 
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1. How to Evaluate Revenue Sources 
By I R W I N T. D A V I D / P a r t n e r , Ch icago 
The revenue sources a city taps and the extent to which it 
relies on each individual source are crucial factors in its 
financial stability. Public officials, taxpayers, and investors 
all, of course, consider such revenue strategy f rom their 
own particular perspective. 
What are some of the characteristics of each major reve-
nue source that affect its usefulness and future viability? 
The fol lowing table describes the source of basic municipal 
revenue options and some of the key features of each. 
First, however, it must be emphasized that one of the dis-
tinguishing features of American local government is its 
diversity. In order to analyze any specific municipality, 
therefore, an array of variables must be taken into account. 
What makes sense in one location may be wholly 
impractical in another. Here are some of these variables 
and how they affect revenue structure and strategy: 
Municipal revenue raising powers—In many states, 
municipalities cannot impose new revenue measures (e.g., 
new taxes) wi thout specific legislative approval. Other 
municipalities have "home ru le" powers which enable 
them to raise revenues in any way they see fit. 
Municipal responsibilities—Some cities have respon-
sibility for education, urban renewal, public housing, 
and/or welfare. In other localities, such functions may be 
the responsibility of separate special districts, the county, or 
the state. The functions for which the city is responsible wil l 
obviously influence its fiscal situation. For example, a city 
that operates a school system wil l have a much larger bud-
get and wil l be much more dependent on state and federal 
aid than a similar city where the schools are independent of 
the municipality. 
City size—A large city has more revenue sources avail-
able to it than does a small city. For instance, only cities over 
a specified size are eligible to receive block grant funds 
from the federal government. Likewise, larger cities have 
more forms of business and industry which can be taxed, 
and are more likely to have a commuter base which may be 
taxed. 
Wealth of residents—As a community's wealth grows, so 
do property values, retail sales, and personal income. A 
larger tax base thus affects the revenue structure and 
strategy. 
State revenue structure—If the state levies a particular 
tax, such as a sales tax, it often wil l provide administrative 
services to municipalities and allow them to "piggy-back" 
similar taxes of their own. 
State of development—A new, growing city wi l l face the 
task of financing schools, public buildings, sewerage, and 
all the other facilities its populat ion requires. But a growing 
population and economic base provides increasing 
revenue potential, too. On the other hand, a mature or 
contracting municipality (a central city) often has a decl in-
ing tax base due to a lower populat ion, declining property 
values, and lower per capita income and wealth. 
Such municipal characteristics must be kept in mind 
when searching for new revenue sources for an individual 
municipality. They wil l also help put the information in the 
table in its proper perspective. 
MUNICIPAL REVENUE SOURCE GUIDE 
LOCAL REVENUE 
SOURCES: 67% of 
municipal gen-
eral revenue, 
1971-72. 
Property Tax— 
Applied to the as-
sessed valuation 
of property lo-
cated in a taxing 
jurisdiction; in 
1971-72 account-
ed for 66% of 
municipal tax rev-
enues and 49% of 
total municipal 
general reve-
nues. More sig-
CONSEQUENCE OF REVENUE SOURCE 
FAVORABLE 
Property taxes obtain more total dollars 
from well-to-do persons or families than 
from lower income families. 
Determining taxes is relatively simple after 
assessed valuations are established. 
UNFAVORABLE 
Regressive, since it takes a larger proportion 
of the income of low-income families than 
of higher income families. 
Tax is based on an assessment of market 
value, which is difficult to make and seems 
arbitrary at times. Different assessment 
practices between jurisdictions lead to dif-
ferent taxable values for similar properties. 
To "equalize" assessment values between 
jurisdictions is very complex and can cause 
controversy. The assessment process is 
sometimes vulnerable to poor administra-
tion and "scandals." 
TREND 
Not a f ru i t fu l 
source of addi-
tional future rev-
enue, since the 
pressure for prop-
erty tax relief has 
been increasing. 
States will conti-
nue to provide 
some relief by 
such methods as 
t he " c i rcu i t 
breakers," which 
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REVENUE 
SOURCE 
n i f i c a n t f o r 
smal ler c i t ies , 
since larger ones 
have wider range 
of revenue op-
tions available. 
Examples of cities 
relying heavily on 
property tax are 
B o s t o n , H a r t -
fo rd , Syracuse, 
a n d I n d i a n a -
polis. 
CONSEQUENCE OF REVENUE SOURCE 
FAVORABLE 
Comparatively stable as a revenue source 
dur ing periods of economic decline. 
Power to seize the property itself reduces 
del inquency problem. 
Taxes based on property value have some 
relationship to services provided by local 
governments, since many municipal ser-
vices are directed toward protect ing and en-
hancing property. 
Property tax encourages owners of non-
product ive or marginal properties to either 
develop the property or sell it to others. 
UNFAVORABLE 
In times of inf lat ion, property tax revenue 
does not increase as rapidly as does the 
revenue f rom other sources, such as the in-
come tax or the sales tax. 
Prospect of forfei ture has l imited impact in 
some center-city areas where wholesale 
property abandonment occurs. 
The relationship between taxes paid and 
services is indirect and imprecise, especially 
compared to user charges. 
The tax tends to discourage improvements, 
since improvements require higher tax pay-
ments. 
Impact of lump sum payments is more pain-
ful to taxpayers than "pay as you g o " meth-
ods used for the sales tax and income tax. 
TREND 
limits taxes to a 
certain percent-
age of total in -
come. 
Wi th their supe-
r io r tax base, 
wealthier com-
m u n i t i e s can 
spend more per 
capita for public 
s e r v i c e s . A t -
tempts to equal-
ize through court 
action have had 
little success. In a 
recent test, the 
Supreme Court 
refused to order 
the overhaul of a 
state's school f i -
nancing system to 
co r rec t var ia -
tions in per capita 
spending attr ib-
utable to differ-
ences in taxable 
wealth. 
Sales Tax— 
Appl ied to all or 
selected classes of 
retail sales. Also, 
may be charged 
for such services 
as hotel rooms 
and leases. Ac-
c o u n t e d f o r 
about 9 percent 
of m u n i c i p a l 
r e v e n u e c o l -
lections in 1971-
72. 
Examples of c i -
ties relying hea-
vily on this tax are 
Jacksonville, Se-
attle, Houston, 
New Orleans, and 
San Anton io . 
Inequities are less serious than those caused 
by other taxes wi th higher rates. 
Related to what people take out of produc-
t ion ; savings are not included. 
Affects all individuals, even those who are 
able to avoid other taxes. Tourists and non-
residents pay something toward the cost of 
government. 
Sales tax revenue increases in inflationary 
periods more rapidly than property and in -
come tax revenue. 
Lends itself to state administration. State 
collections and compliance administration 
avoids dupl icat ion, double taxation, admin-
istrative inefficiencies, tax return prepara-
t ion , and compliance problems. 
Coordinat ing rates among adjacent commu-
nities can avoid loss of retail sales in an in -
dividual municipal i ty. 
Regressive, since it takes a larger percent-
age of the income of low income individuals 
than of higher income individuals; regres-
siveness can be reduced by exempting such 
staples as food and drugs. 
Much more sensitive than property tax to 
recessionary periods. 
Collection depends upon local retailers; as-
suring proper collection and control can re-
quire a sophisticated, qui te often computer-
based, system which may be beyond the 
scope of many municipalities. 
I mpact of even slight rate differences among 
adjacent communit ies is much greater than 
for property or income taxes. A one percent 
difference between the rates of a central 
city and surrounding suburbs can cause a 
six percent reduction in per capita city sales. 
Wi l l likely be used 
more in future 
years. Munic ipal 
rates wil l be in ad-
di t ion to state 
rates but should 
be coordinated 
wi th other mun i -
cipalities to avoid 
a "back- lash." 
Each municipal i -
ty w i l l , to the ex-
t e n t a l l o w e d , 
consider ways to 
e l i m i n a t e " r e -
g ress ive " fea-
tures when es-
tablishing the tax. 
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REVENUE 
SOURCE 
CONSEQUENCE OF REVENUE SOURCE 
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE TREND 
Income Tax— 
Appl ied to wages 
earned, gener-
ally collected by a 
wi thhold ing sys-
tem wi th annual 
tax returns. In 
1 9 7 1 - 7 2 a c -
counted for 7 per-
cent of all mun i -
cipal revenue. 
Examples of c i -
ties relying hea-
vily on this tax are 
New York, Phila-
delphia, Wash-
ington, DC, Co-
l u m b u s , a n d 
Detroit. 
Provides revenue beyond what can feasibly 
be raised by increasing other taxes. 
Effective way to tax the commuter who uses 
city services. 
The wi thhold ing method makes this a "pay 
as you g o " tax, hence more palatable than 
the property tax. 
When dealing wi th salaries and wages, the 
income tax is progressive since taxes paid 
are t ied to individual income. 
Once established, the costs of administra-
t ion are f ixed. 
Even if the surrounding municipalit ies do 
not use the income tax, it is dif f icult for an 
individual to change jobs or his place of resi-
dence to avoid the tax. Therefore, differ-
ences between jurisdictions are less likely 
to result in revenue reductions than in the 
case of the sales tax. 
In general, income tax cities are character-
ized by lower property taxes as a percent of 
total taxes and by lower per capita total 
taxes. Per capita property tax and total 
taxes have generally increased at a lower 
rate than in other cities. 
Not widely used because of the political 
problems and pressures against its adoption. 
The commuter's lack of voice in how money 
collected wi l l be spent is a political inequi-
ty; to differentiate between residents and 
commuters in the tax base creates an ad-
ministrative diff iculty. The wi thhold ing sys-
tem can alleviate some of this problem. 
Special state legislation may be necessary to 
secure the power to impose an income tax. 
Wi thho ld ing may be a problem because of 
differences in jurisdictions and application. 
For instance, tax may apply in the munic i -
pality where an individual works, where he 
resides, or both. 
May be regressive if it applies only to sala-
ries and wages, since high income indiv id-
uals earn more of their total income in non-
labor (dividends and interest) income. If 
non-labor income is inc luded, state admin-
istration of local systems may be required. 
The tax is often dependent upon employer 
collection (the wi thhold ing system), which 
requires an audit, compliance, and admin-
istrative structure that is typically beyond 
the means of all but the largest cities. State 
or county administration of the tax is some-
times the answer to this problem. 
The local income 
tax is extraordi-
narily product ive 
and preserves lo-
cal autonomy; its 
use is likely to 
grow in both rela-
tive and absolute 
terms. 
User Charges— 
Direct charges for 
services r e n -
dered. Appl ied 
to items such as 
school lunches, 
recreational facil-
ities, sewers, gar-
bage col lect ion, 
hosp i ta l care, 
parking, and tolls. 
Directly relates cost of service to benefit f rom 
the service; services need not be subsidized; 
expansion of the service is matched by ex-
panded revenues; user fees can be used to 
ration the output of the service; fee setting 
can promote increased social planning in a 
municipality. 
Of ten based on "what the traffic wi l l bear" 
rather than allocation of actual cost. 
L i k e l y t o i n -
crease, since sys-
tem is adaptable 
to many services. 
28 
REVENUE 
SOURCE 
CONSEQUENCE OF REVENUE SOURCE 
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE TREND 
Special assess-
ments for side-
walks, other im-
provements are 
similar but, l ike a 
tax, they are man-
datory. In 1971-
72, user charges 
accoun ted fo r 
11% of municipal 
genera l reve-
nues. 
C i t i e s r e l y i n g 
heavily on these 
charges are Jack-
sonville, Seattle, 
New Orleans, and 
Denver. 
Theoretically enables citizens who do not 
wish to use a service to avoid having to pay 
for it. 
Vo lume of user fees indicates when the ser-
vices should be expanded or reduced. 
Special assessments enable municipality to 
charge for improvements that enhance 
property value. 
Some services are vital to life and health 
(such as sanitation and hospital services). 
Whi le the citizen can regulate his use of 
such services, he cannot fully avoid them. 
User charges are often administered 
through special districts established to han-
dle a particular service, which fosters frag-
mentation of government. 
Property owner does not have individual 
choice concerning installation of the im-
provement. 
FEDERAL A N D 
STATE GRANTS— 
33% of municipal 
general revenue 
in 1971-72. 
Categorical 
Grants— 
Federal or state 
funds for specific 
programs or cate-
gories of service; 
f o r e x a m p l e , 
school grants to 
aid underpr iv i -
leged chi ldren, 
handicapped chi l -
dren, non-Eng-
lish speaking chi l -
dren, and del in-
quent chi ldren. 
Grant programs promote national and state 
priorities at the municipal level and provide 
significant funds to local governments. 
Localities which are organized and system-
atic in their approach to grants can secure 
needed funds they wou ld otherwise have to 
do wi thout . 
Not clear that social objectives are met by 
the programs. At times the specific needs of 
a local government are ignored. 
Extensive federal or state "str ings" attached 
to categorical grants restrict municipal deci-
sion-making and autonomy. 
Considerable duplication and overlapping 
among programs. 
Competi t ive application process sometimes 
overemphasizes "grantsmanship." Pro-
grams may be started simply because a grant 
is available for that purpose. 
Municipalit ies frequently have trouble rais-
ing the local matching amount required un-
der most categorical programs. 
The percentage 
of total govern-
ment spending 
devoted to grants 
has been decl in-
ing for several 
years (although 
absolute amounts 
are still rising). 
Therefore, the lo-
cal governments 
should place a 
premium on ef f i -
cient administra-
t ion to gain maxi-
mum return f rom 
each grant dollar. 
Federal and state 
aid offices wi l l be 
estab l ished by 
more cities to 
seek and coord i -
nate grants. 
Centralized ac-
count ing systems 
that can track 
grants in all city 
agencies wi l l be 
used more. 
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REVENUE 
SOURCE 
CONSEQUENCE OF REVENUE SOURCE 
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE TREND 
General Reve-
nue Sharing— 
Automatic grants 
to state and local 
governments bas-
ed on statutory 
formula that take 
i n t o a c c o u n t 
populat ion, per 
capi ta i n c o m e , 
and tax effort. 
Enacted in 1972 
for a five-year 
p e r i o d , w i t h 
about $6 bi l l ion 
distr ibuted each 
year. Few l imita-
tions on how the 
funds may be 
used. 
Each unit of local government receives its 
proport ionate share of the funds as pre-
scribed by law; "grantsmanship" is not a 
factor. 
Shifts decision-making to local levels and 
reduces the pol icy-making powers of Con-
gress. 
Encourages the absorption of fragmented 
special districts by units of general-purpose 
government (states, counties, cities, towns) 
since only the latter are eligible for revenue 
sharing. 
Provides flexibil i ty and autonomy to local 
governments in setting priorities and spend-
ing funds. 
Revenue sharing funds have helped locali-
ties avoid tax increases that wou ld have 
been necessary otherwise. 
Requires no local match. 
Provides consistent source of funds. 
Not subject to annual Congressional appro-
priations. 
Relatively small federal staff administers 
revenue sharing. 
Requires citizen participation in spending 
decisions. 
Local priorities can be established wi thout 
" in ter ference" f rom Washington. 
Large cities assert they should receive a 
more generous share of the funds than the 
formula now permits. 
Reduces power of Congress to set national 
priorities. 
Ineligibil i ty for addit ional funds may be un-
fair penalty for communit ies where absorp-
t ion of special districts by city government 
is impractical. 
Economic condit ions and the soaring cost of 
publ ic services mean localities have little 
leeway in deciding how to spend revenue 
sharing funds. 
Many local officials argue revenue sharing 
was " s o l d " as incremental money, not a 
stopgap. Also, they charge Congress and the 
Administrat ion use the availability of reve-
nue sharing as an excuse for underfunding 
other grant programs. 
Amount does not increase in times of econ-
omic distress. 
Program is not permanent; continuation af-
ter 1976 depends on extension by Congress. 
Limited ability to insure compliance wi th 
rules on equal employment opportuni ty, 
construction wages, and other matters. 
The fo rm and extent of citizen participation 
varies greatly, depending on local c i rcum-
stances. 
In some cases, minori ty groups do not get 
what they consider their fair share of reve-
nue sharing funds. 
Local g o v e r n -
ments wi l l be in -
creasingly ner-
v o u s a b o u t 
commit t ing re-
venue shar ing 
funds to long-
term activities u n -
ti l the extension 
beyond 1976 is as-
sured. They may 
result in post-
p o n e m e n t s of 
n e e d e d p r o -
grams and pro-
jects. 
If Congress re-
fuses to cont inue 
revenue sharing, 
the credibi l i ty of 
f e d e r a l f i s c a l 
commitments to 
l o c a l g o v e r n -
ment wi l l be im-
paired. 
The c o n t i n u a -
t ion of revenue 
sharing wi l l de-
pend upon how 
the people feel 
about the ability 
of local govern-
ments to allocate 
monies more ef-
fectively than the 
federal govern-
ment. 
Block Grants or 
"Special" Reve-
nue Sharing— 
Grants for broad-
ly-defined activ-
ities in general 
areas such as 
manpower, c r im-
inal justice, so-
cial services, and 
communi ty de-
velopment. 
Gives cities greater control over the pro-
grams involved. 
Many localities lack previous experience in 
such areas as manpower training and com-
munity development. 
Few municipalit ies now have the staff capa-
bilities to prepare the annual plans required 
by block grant programs. 
Respective roles 
and responsibil-
ities of federal 
a g e n c i e s a n d 
local grantees wi l l 
cont inue to un -
dergo an often 
painful sorting-
out process. 
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SOURCE 
CONSEQUENCE OF REVENUE SOURCE 
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE TREND 
E l i g i b i l i t y f o r 
f u n d s a n d 
amount received 
each year is de-
termined by sta-
tutory formula for 
each p r o g r a m . 
Seve ra l b l o c k 
grant programs 
are l imited to c i -
ties over a cer-
tain size. 
Provides more local autonomy than cate-
gorical grants. 
Requires cit izen participation in most of the 
programs. 
Requires accountabil i ty for the use of the 
funds f rom the local officials. 
Statutory formula reduces the "grantsman-
ship" factor. 
More federal "str ings," less local autonomy, 
than in general revenue sharing. 
Citizen participation is subject to same vari-
ation observed in the case of revenue shar-
ing. 
Local governments are hard pressed to pro-
vide accountability since they lack experi-
ence in evaluating and document ing the 
results of grant programs. Financial control 
is also a problem where block grant funds 
are distributed to numerous city and non-
prof i t agencies. 
Federal approval of annual spending plans 
is generally required; to some extent, mun i -
cipalities must tailor their plans to fit fed-
eral priorities and preferences. 
May be further 
consolidations of 
categorical grants 
into new block 
grant programs 
due to their pop-
ularity wi th local 
officials. 
Cities wi l l press 
Congress for in -
creased funding 
to go along wi th 
the greater power 
afforded by block 
grants. 
Borrowing— 
B o r r o w i n g fo r 
long-term needs 
(capital improve-
ments) or for 
shorter term re-
quirements (tax 
anticipation notes). 
In 1971-72, total 
municipal debt 
outstanding was 
$52.6 bi l l ion. Of 
this, $45.9 bi l l ion 
(88 percent) was 
long-term debt, 
of which 60 per-
cent was backed 
by the cities' full 
faith and credit. 
Of all municipal-
ities, New York 
City is the most 
heavily reliant on 
b o r r o w i n g as a 
revenue source. 
Because of exemption f rom federal income 
tax, interest expense is lower than on com-
parable industrial bonds. 
Newer forms of tax-exempt bonds such as 
industrial development, revenue, and 
"mora l ob l igat ion" bonds can be issued 
wi thout the ful l faith and credit of the issu-
ing body. 
1975 securities reform law extends SEC reg-
ulation to dealers in municipal securities, 
reducing the potential for abuses in the tax-
exempt bond market. 
Special districts can be created to issue 
debt, thus avoiding restrictions pertaining 
to municipali ty. 
Provides large amounts of funds for capital 
improvements and related efforts. 
Interest costs tend to be burdensome for 
local governments even wi th lower interest 
rates. 
The viability of "mora l ob l igat ion" bonds is 
currently being tested in specific cases such 
as New York's Urban Development Corp. 
Increased regulation could mean increased 
disclosure by municipalit ies, although lan-
guage inserted in the law seeks to prevent 
new report ing demands on issuers. 
Proliferation of special districts can splinter 
local governments and lead to coordination 
and communicat ion difficulties. 
Some people object to borrowing as "mo r t -
gaging the fu ture , " especially if used to pay 
operating expenses. 
Plight of New 
York City and 
other large mun i -
c ipa l i t ies may 
have adverse ef-
fects upon all 
l o c a l g o v e r n -
ments seeking to 
issue bonds. 
C o n t i n u e d ex-
e m p t i o n f o r 
municipal bonds 
may be cha l -
l enged d u r i n g 
upcoming Con-
gressional tax re-
form hearings. 
Corporations us-
ing tax-exempt 
indus t r ia l p o l -
l u t i o n c o n t r o l 
bonds to f inance 
air and water po l -
l u t i o n a b a t e -
men t fac i l i t ies 
may o f fe r i n -
creasing compe-
t i t ion to munic i -
palities, who may 
seek to have ex-
emptions for such 
bonds revoked. & 
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2. How to Get a Quality Credit Rating 
by PHILIP M . D E A R B O R N , Executive D i rec to r 
Distr ic t of C o l u m b i a M u n i c i p a l Research Bureau , Inc. 
What does the quality of a city's credit depend on? It is 
usually l inked to a variety of factors, such as amount of debt, 
quantity and quality of tax base, historic record of debt 
repayment, and legal and administrative requirements and 
practices. But these elements do not really define quality in 
terms that directly relate to the investor's major concern— 
getting interest and principal payments on t ime. The fact is 
that when an investor perceives that payments wil l not be 
met, he wil l consider the quality of the debt less desirable 
than it is when he is assured the payment wil l be on time. 
This wi l l be true even though the ultimate security of each 
investment may be equal. 
It is my purpose to demonstrate that quality involves 
more than testing protection of debt against permanent or 
extended default—which has not occurred in a general 
obligation issue since Wor ld War I I , and which many ob-
servers think may never occur for any major issues. It re-
quires getting into the inner workings of government and 
analyzing the f low of cash through that government. 
The ultimate test of credit quality is having cash available 
in the future to pay debt service commitments when due. 
The key element is cash—not physical assets, not the bal-
ance sheet accruals, not secondary guarantees, and not the 
potential for raising cash. Whi le all of these may contr ibute 
to the eventual solution of a financial problem, they are of 
immediate value only to the extent that they can be con-
verted to cash when cash is needed to pay debt service. 
In analyzing credit one must weigh the factors that wil l 
influence future cash availability. Good cash f low informa-
tion is not available on a historical or comparative basis 
f rom the census or other national sources. It requires 
detailed analysis of individual financial reports. Since a 
mult i tude of factors may affect cash f low, such projection 
models have been unreliable unti l now. That is why it is 
important to analyze the factors affecting internal cash 
flow. It is only by understanding such a conceptual model 
that we can then perceive how external factors—econ-
omy, social changes, federal aid, political pressures, etc.— 
can cause some governments to have problems meeting 
their debt service requirements. 
If we assume that no general purpose local government 
wil l ever reach the point at which it has no assets and no 
taxable wealth wi th which to meet its debt service 
requirements, then it must fo l low that any cash f low prob-
lem can be resolved by appropriate government action 
taken on a timely basis. 
In our cash f low discussion it wil l be assumed that a se-
quence of events wil l occur somewhat as follows. During 
the fiscal year a financial crisis wi l l occur and the gov-
ernment wi l l f ind itself wi th payrolls, debt service, and 
other claims due that cannot be paid f rom current cash 
f low. Such an occurrence may be caused by a revenue fai l-
ure stemming f rom lit igation, economic downturn , or 
major taxpayer bankruptcy; it may be caused by excessive 
claims caused by l it igation, labor settlements, mandated 
obligations, or short-term debt that cannot be renewed; or 
it may be caused by fraud or general mismanagement. 
When such a financial crisis occurs, the first requirement 
wil l be to f ind cash to meet current claims so that the gov-
ernment can continue to operate. After these immediate 
cash problems are resolved, there must then be an analysis 
to determine how the problem wil l be solved over the 
longer term. Ordinari ly the solutions wi l l mean increasing 
revenues, decreasing expenditures, or both. The effec-
tiveness of the actions taken wil l in turn depend on the 
variety of legal and practical alternatives available. 
There are three important factors that must be evaluated 
when considering the risk of default. First, the government 
must have sufficient cash available to pay debt service dur-
ing any period of crisis. Because most local governments 
budget and tax on an annual basis, cash equal to at least one 
year's debt service is desirable. 
Second, there must be some compulsion on local officials 
to take prompt corrective action to restore l iquidity and to 
meet future debt service obligations. 
Third, the local officials must have the ability to correct 
the problem. This means they must not only be able to 
perceive the problem correctly but also be legally and 
practically able to take action. 
Each of these factors have gradations that affect the risk. 
For example, more weight has customarily been given to 
the ability to take corrective action. General obligation 
securities which have low cash availability and low as-
surance of corrective action, but which are secured by un-
l imited taxing authority, are rated higher than revenue 
bonds having good cash availability, good assurance of cor-
rective action by officials, but no ability to use increased 
taxes to resolve the problem. The factors are illustrated in 
the fo l lowing out l ine and are arranged in a tentative 
descending order of security. A brief description of each 
factor and how it relates to cash f low and perceived risk wil l 
provide a starting point for data collection and model 
bui lding. 
I. Cash Availability 
We have postulated that ideally one year's debt service 
should be available in cash to meet a crisis contingency. 
Thus, it is necessary to review the potential cash situations 
of governments as they relate to payment of debt services. 
1. Reserve Held by Independent Trustee: The strongest 
cash position occurs when cash is held by an independent 
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trustee wi th authority to disburse funds directly to the gov-
ernment's debtors wi thout approving action by the gov-
ernment. This arrangement is typically associated with 
mortgage revenue bonds. Whi le it is conceivable that in a 
national financial crisis the trustee might be unable to 
perform, even this risk could be avoided by requiring the 
trustee to invest the reserve funds in short-term U S gov-
ernment securities, kept in a segregated account. The 
trustee would normally be a bank, but could also be a state 
or federal agency. 
2. Reserve Held by Government Itself: The next best 
alternative is a debt service cash reserve fund under the 
control of the government. Such a fund should be segre-
gated f rom other funds in its banking and investments and 
should be payable by local officials under well-defined 
conditions of crisis, wi thout further local legislative action. 
3. Cash Balance in Debt Service Fund: Some gov-
ernments may maintain a year-to-year cash balance in their 
debt service fund. Such a balance is generally wi thout the 
protection of full segregation and wi thout the require-
ment that officials disburse such funds only under certain 
conditions. The hazard is that the funds wil l be used when 
they are not needed to meet a crisis, and wi l l , therefore, not 
be available at a t ime of crisis. 
The ultimate test of credit quality is having cash 
available in the future to pay debt service 
commitments. The key element is cash—not 
physical assets, not the balance sheet accruals, 
not secondary guarantees, and not the potential 
for raising cash. 
4. State Guarantee: This is a direct guarantee of the debt 
based on the state's credit or a guarantee fund ; or in the 
form of a commitment to pay debt service, f rom the next 
state funds due a local government. In either instance, the 
critical considerations are the extent to which action is dis-
cretionary on the part of state officials; the delay that may 
result between the due date of debt service and actual 
payment; and the cash resources available at the state level 
to support the commitments during periods in which a 
large number of units may require aid. 
5. General Fund Cash Balance: Some governments, 
instead of maintaining cash balances or cash reserves for 
debt service, choose to maintain a good cash balance for 
any unforeseen requirement. This opt ion provides the gov-
ernment more flexibil ity in its use of cash resources. 
Unfortunately, many of the same reasons that might 
precipitate a crisis wou ld probably wipe out a cash balance 
available for general purposes, and leave the government 
wi thout these funds for debt service. For example, if a 
police payroll were due prior to the debt service payment, 
it is likely that the cash wou ld be used for the payroll and 
not held for the debt service payment. 
6. Availability of Short-Term Borrowing: When the gov-
ernment's overall financial condit ion is sound and the 
banking industry is healthy, short-term borrowing is a 
logical and feasible method of obtaining cash. However, in 
the past many crises have been characterized by the inabil-
ity of banks to make or renew such loans. 
7. Emergency State or Federal Aid: It is likely that cash 
assistance f rom another level of government at a t ime of 
crisis wou ld carry a high political cost for local officials— 
probably loss of local control over finances. If the financial 
crisis threatens only debt service, such a price may be too 
high. If, however, the crisis is such that it also imperils a 
broad range of local services, this may be a practical 
alternative. 
I I . Ability to Take Corrective Actions 
Because financial crises may occur for a variety of reasons, it 
is diff icult to predict in advance the particular action which 
wil l be required. In general, most crises wil l be resolved by 
increased revenues, decreased expenditures, or a com-
bination of both, but wi th in each of these general solutions 
are a variety of individual actions. Any foreclosing of 
options wil l narrow the ability of officials to pick the best 
actions to f i t the circumstances. Therefore, the gov-
ernment possessing the most options should be the one 
best able to respond to crises. 
1. Unlimited Power of Local Officials to Impose or 
Increase any Taxes or Charges: Unless the national econ-
omy becomes a complete disaster, it is unlikely that any 
substantial unit of local government wil l reach a point at . 
which there is no cash f low and no tangible wealth in the 
community. This wou ld , of course, represent ultimate gov-
ernment bankruptcy, but no such case has occurred in this 
country. The government's problem is using a mix of taxes 
and charges in a way that wil l be effective in generating cash 
to meet obligations. One tax alone, such as the property 
tax, may be unable to do the job if there is a deep recession 
in property value, or if several major taxpayers fail. How-
ever, if the community can increase the sales tax, which taps 
the cash f low of federal transfer payments as well as locally 
generated cash f low, the problem can be more easily 
resolved. 
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2. Unlimited Right to Increase Property Taxes for Debt 
Service: States that have been unwi l l ing to give broad un-
l imited taxing powers have usually given unl imited 
property taxing powers for debt service. However, a 
property tax may be the least effective tax opt ion in a crisis, 
and it also presents political problems when limited to debt 
service. How long, for example, can a government expect 
taxpayers to pay taxes for debt service whi le they are not 
receiving other vital government services? 
3. Legal and Practical Right to Lay Off Employees and 
Reduce Expenditures: Whi le it is easy to suggest reducing 
expenditures, the facts may make a diff icult opt ion. Many 
local governments have a high percentage of fixed costs for 
debt service, employee pensions, expenditures required by 
state law, and other long-term commitments. Other fixed 
costs, such as employee pensions, may have annual 
increases that add additional pressure. 
But even costs that are in theory controllable may be 
politically or legally impractical to reduce. Civil Service 
restrictions and labor contracts often make layoffs a long 
and ineffective solution. Other expenditures such as util ity 
bills are practically uncontrollable—can sewage treatment 
pumps be turned off? In fact, the long-term problem on the 
expenditure side may be how to provide for the future 
increased costs rather than expecting that reduced costs 
can help resolve a crisis. 
4. Legal Right of Local Government to Sell or Otherwise 
Liquidate Assets to Fulfill Claims: Traditionally there has 
3. How to Apply for Bond Ratings 
by FRED H. ROHN/Partner, Newark 
According to today's headlines, executives in many cities 
are look ing forwaysto improvethe i rcommuni ty 's f inan-
cial status in the eyes of investors. Discussions with major 
rating agencies reveal that they have little specific 
information available on individual municipalities. The 
fol lowing is a checklist of supplementary data required 
to secure a rating. It appears to be the type of informa-
tion that agencies need. Note that the list is l imited to 
general obligation bonds. 
1. Schedule of outstanding debts, listed by maturities, 
segregated by security, wi th comment on any over-
lap wi th other taxing units. 
2. Five-year projection of capital improvements, 
including those with overlapping taxing juris-
dictions, together with anticipated methods of 
f inancing. Include outl ine of material assumptions. 
3. Current populat ion estimate, and census for at least 
past 10 years. 
4. Three latest annual reports, including auditor's 
letters of recommendations and auditor's report, if 
any. 
5. Current and past two years' budgets. 
6. School enrol lment currently and over past five years. 
Analysis of projected enrol lment over next five years 
and description of how projections were prepared. 
Tabulation of present school structures, capacity. 
Details of any sending or receiving district relation-
ships. Description of academic program. 
7. Assessed valuations for past four years, segregated 
among industrial, commercial, and residential 
properties. Basis of assessment and latest reassess-
ment. 
8. Brief summary of the community including: 
a. Building activity level, industrial, commercial, 
residential. 
b. Available land and its zoning; zoning map. 
c. Util ity and transportation facilities, their ade-
quacy. 
d. Largest taxpayers including levels of employment. 
e. Agricultural and mineral activity (if applicable). 
f. Public institutions, if any; employment. 
g. Family income. 
h. General economic conditions, 
i. Industries moving in, moving out. 
9. Tax collection data for past four years; current antici-
pations and basis for estimate. 
10. Qualifications and experience of management per-
sonnel. 
This checklist can serve as a guide to those re-
sponsible for applying for general obligation bond 
ratings. Presenting a complete package of such back-
ground information, together with the pre-sale material, 
wil l enable the rating service to give a prompt evaluation. 
Requirements supporting revenue bond applications 
vary, but generally require a formal feasibility study. & 
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appeared to be little market for most municipal assets. 
Recent trends have suggested that this may not be the case. 
For instance, many local governments have found it pos-
sible to sell sewage or water treatment facilities, airports, 
mass transit systems, port facilities, and other assets to 
regional or state authorities for a profit or at least for as-
sumption of debt. Other assets can also be sold privately, 
such as surplus vacant land. 
5. The Federal Bankruptcy Act: This act does not provide 
any ultimate solution to a crisis, but it does provide a prac-
tical means for a government to impose a solution on debt-
ors. Under this law a government can refinance its debt so 
as to make debt service payments compatible with its long-
term solution. In at least one instance (Ranger, Texas), how-
ever, the refinancing of debt has not been accompanied by 
a long-term solution. This has resulted in a periodic reoc-
currence of the crisis and has defeated the purpose of this 
bankruptcy act. 
I I I . Requirement for Corrective Actions by Local Officials 
All the available alternatives to resolving a government's 
problem wil l be of little help if there is no compulsion on 
local officials to recognize their problems and take cor-
rective action. A variety of compulsions may exist to bring 
about such actions. 
1. Contractual Commitment Enforceable Against Local 
Officials: Every public official is sensitive to actions brought 
against him personally. In the case of Hamtramck,Michigan, 
a bitter, divided city council found a basis for taking cor-
rective action when they were individually facing con-
tempt of court. A contractual commitment to raise taxes or 
service charges when supported by a court order wil l cer-
tainly supersede most political considerations, and there-
fore must be ranked as an effective solution to making 
officials face their responsibilities. Such a solution does, 
however, negate the concept of political accountability for 
actions, and may be an unacceptable solution in many 
communities. 
2. State Law Requiring Specific State Officer or Agency to 
Take Action: A carefully wri t ten state law requiring action 
by local officials under conditions of financial crisis can be 
effective, if a specifically designated state official or agency 
has the responsibility for active enforcement. This implies, 
of course, that the state wil l collect adequate reliable cur-
rent financial information to determine compliance, and 
that state officials wil l be politically insulated so that they 
can carry out their responsibilities. 
3. Passive State Law: A considerably less effective state 
law requires local corrective action, but wi thout making a 
specific state officer responsible for monitor ing local 
finances and taking action. Frequently such laws require a 
"balanced budget," or that obligations not be incurred in 
excess of estimated revenues. Such laws have had a history 
of misinterpretation. Even when the law is explicit, local 
officials may f ind it desirable to delay compliance, or to mis-
interpret what is required of them, if the law requires a 
politically unpopular tax increase. 
A contractual commitment to raise taxes or 
service charges when supported by a court 
order will certainly supersede most political 
considerations, and therefore must be ranked as 
an effective solution to making officials face 
their responsibilities. 
4. Local Law Requirement: Local charters frequently 
impose strict duties on local officials. If fo l lowed, there 
should be quick recovery f rom any temporary financial 
crisis. Unfortunately, the same local officials who have the 
responsibility to act are generally the officials required to 
enforce the charter provisions. To bring legal action by cit i-
zens or debtors, however, is costly and time consuming. 
5. General Legal and Moral Duty: In the final analysis, it 
may be that the only effective compulsion for corrective 
action by local officials is their own legal and moral 
obligation to maintain a sound, well-managed govern-
ment. Each of the other alternatives, whi le effective in 
theory, wil l probably fail if there is not a commitment by 
local officials to resolve the problem. This leads to a di lem-
ma in credit analysis, because it requires quantif ication of 
the predicted behavior of local officials in times of crisis. 
This is a particularly diff icult task, because officials change 
rapidly in local governments. Because of these difficulties 
of evaluation, the practical solution is to give a low rating to 
corrective actions based primarily on reliance on general 
moral and legal obligations, even though this is unfair to 
those communit ies wi th highly responsible officials. £ 
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